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At the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, there 
was considerable optimism that the Convention would usher in a new age of marine environmental 
protection. This article argues that, while UNCLOS did contain important innovations for marine 
environmental protections, key structural problems prevented the Convention from fulfilling more 
optimistic predictions of success. Concepts such as freedom of the high seas and exclusive flag state 
jurisdiction as well as the lack of an effective institution with competence over the law of the sea 
generally have impeded progress. Instead, states have relied on incremental development to seek 
improvements in the law. The article evaluates whether two recent developments will progress the 
goal of marine environmental protection. First, a number of recent international judicial decisions 
interpreting treaty and customary principles of international law have clarified and extended state 
environmental obligations. Second, negotiations for a new treaty on the protection and sustainable 
use of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction offer hope that gaps in UNCLOS might be 
filled. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 has been described as an 
environmental treaty that established a dynamic international legal framework for the protection of 
the marine environment.2 In 1992, Philip Allott argued that UNCLOS was a "slow-motion 
  
*  Associate Professor, Law Faculty, Victoria University of Wellington. 
1  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 December 1982, 
entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS]. 
2  James Harrison Saving the Oceans through Law: The International Legal Framework for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017) at 304. 
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metamorphosis".3 He claimed that UNCLOS was "a half-formed new structural uniqueness, full of 
painful ambiguities and exciting possibilities".4 Allott viewed UNCLOS as a combination of old-
fashioned international law based on conceptions of property and a move towards a governance 
approach to achieving social objectives, including the protection of the marine environment.5 This 
article asks whether the metamorphosis that Allott so optimistically forecast has been fulfilled. In 
other words, has the law of the sea emerged as a fully-developed system to achieve the vital objective 
of protecting the environment?  
There is no doubt that UNCLOS was a momentous step towards environmental protection of the 
oceans. Subsequent developments include the negotiation of a myriad of new, sectorally-focused 
treaties, many of which have the environment as a key consideration. Despite these advances, 
however, the state of the ocean environment has worsened in a number of important respects.6 The 
number of fish stocks that are overfished has increased over time rather than decreased, despite the 
existence of a number of regional fisheries management organisations which are responsible for 
achieving sustainable catches. It is estimated that 90 per cent of top predators in the oceans have been 
depleted from pre-industrial levels.7 In many parts of the world, destructive fishing practices heavily 
impact on marine ecosystems. Plastic pollution of the ocean has become recognised as one of the 
biggest threats to healthy oceans. Another significant threat is the impact of climate change, although 
that has yet to be adequately addressed.8 
This article seeks to evaluate why, in some important respects, the law of the sea has not been 
able to respond adequately to new and old environmental problems. In some ways, UNCLOS 
facilitated steady improvements in environmental protection. However, in other ways the structure 
and content of UNCLOS has slowed, and in some cases prevented, the dynamic evolution of the law 
of the sea for environmental protection. In other words, the promise of Allott's metamorphosis has not 
been achieved. The article takes fisheries and marine biodiversity as two examples of fields in which 
progress has been difficult. 
  
3  Philip Allott "Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea" (1992) 86 AJIL 764 at 765. 
4  At 765–766. 
5  At 786. 
6  See Duncan Currie "The Oceans: the Law of the Sea Convention as a form of global governance" (2017) 
13(1) PQ 32. 
7  Ransom A Myers and Boris Worm "Rapid worldwide depletion of predatory fish communities" (2003) 423 
Nature 280 at 282. 
8  Tim Stephens "Warming Waters and Souring Seas: Climate Change and Ocean Acidification" in Donald R 
Rothwell and others (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015) 777. 
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Despite the problems caused by the structure of UNCLOS, incremental progress to improve the 
legal framework has been made. This article highlights two recent developments which may be 
important steps towards filling some of the governance gaps left by the Convention. First, there 
appears to be an increasing willingness by dispute settlement bodies to use customary international 
law and general principles in UNCLOS to clarify state obligations in respect of the environment. 
Second, the international community is currently undertaking negotiations for a new implementing 
treaty addressing the sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
However, the article demonstrates that significant obstacles stand in the way of these developments 
being as effective as they could be. 
II LAW OF THE SEA PRIOR TO 1982 
The development of the law of the sea for many centuries was primarily about power and 
economics: who controlled maritime areas and resources in areas close to the coasts, balanced with 
the need for merchant ships and navies to conduct their businesses on the important maritime 
highways of the world. A key motivation for the push for control over territorial seas was the desire 
of coastal states to ensure that the fishing resources of the coastal waters were reserved for the 
exclusive use of the coastal state.9 This was primarily a concern to protect economic interests rather 
than about protection of the environment.10 
It was clear that in isolated areas marine resources could be exhausted by overharvesting. The 
Pacific Fur Seals Arbitration in 1893 was a good example of a situation in which international dispute 
settlement was used to try to resolve a practical problem created by excessive harvesting of a finite 
resource – seals.11 Although on the one hand it can be classified as an environmental dispute – the 
impact of harvesting on the seal population – in most respects the dispute was about the need to have 
distributive rules to prevent the overexploitation of a resource. Other examples of this phenomenon 
include the development of the international instruments designed to regulate whaling.12 
Regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) began to emerge as states came to 
recognise that fish stocks were also vulnerable to overfishing. Some of the earlier RFMOs that were 
created include the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (1949), the General Fisheries Council 
  
9  RR Churchill and AV Lowe The law of the sea (3rd ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999) at 
72. 
10  Allott, above n 3, at 767. 
11  Award between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to the rights of jurisdiction of United 
States in the Bering's sea and the preservation of fur seals (1893) 28 RIAA 263. See Donald R Rothwell and 
Tim Stephens The International Law of the Sea (2nd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2016) at 316. 
12  Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 155 LNTS 349 (opened for signature 24 September 1931, entered 
into force 16 January 1935); and International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 161 UNTS 72 
(opened for signature 2 December 1946, entered into force 10 November 1948). 
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for the Mediterranean (1952) and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (1966). 
Concern also began to grow about the impact of pollution on the marine environment. The 
International Maritime Organization, which was established in 1948 to focus on safety at sea, began 
to also address issues arising from pollution. In 1967, the Torrey Canyon incident highlighted the 
dangers for the marine environment when an oil tanker ran aground off the coast of England, spilling 
117,000 tonnes of oil.13 Although some international conventions already existed for protecting the 
marine environment at that stage,14 the following decade saw a flurry of conventions negotiated under 
the auspices of the International Maritime Organization.15 
III THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY 
In 1972 the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm recommended 
that governments implement existing instruments for controlling marine pollution and take other steps 
to monitor and prevent such pollution.16 However, at the commencement of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973, there was no "generally accepted framework or structure 
of legal principles capable of dealing with the full range of marine pollution problems".17 It is 
therefore notable that Part XII of UNCLOS creates an extensive framework for marine protection. 
Allott suggested that Part XII represented "the new wine of communitarianism spilling over from the 
old bottle of legal formalism".18 
Part XII contains a number of general principles requiring states to take steps to prevent, reduce 
and control harm to the marine environment. The focus is very much on pollution, although not all of 
  
13  ED Brown "The Lessons of the Torrey Canyon: International Law Aspects" (1968) 21 CLP 113.  
14  International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 327 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 
12 May 1954, entered into force 26 July 1958), modified by amendments in 1962 and 1969. 
15  International Convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties 970 
UNTS 211 (opened for signature 29 November 1969, entered into force 6 May 1975); International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 973 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 29 November 
1969, entered into force 19 June 1975); Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter 1046 UNTS 138 (opened for signature 29 December 1972, entered into force 30 
August 1975); and Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the prevention of pollution 
from ships, 1973 1340 UNTS 61 (opened for signature 17 February 1978, entered into force 2 October 1983). 
16  Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment UN Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1972) 
at 22–24. 
17  Alan E Boyle "Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention" (1985) 79 AJIL347 at 348. 
18  Allott, above n 3, at 785. 
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the general principles are limited to pollution.19 Part XII also establishes a framework outlining which 
states have jurisdiction over vessels that may pollute the marine environment and creates safeguards 
for vessels accused of polluting. UNCLOS does not create specific standards for pollution, rather it 
elaborates the general principles and obligations and recognises that the specific standards will be 
implemented through other international instruments.20  
Beyond Part XII, however, the influence of environmental principles is far less pervasive. In 
relation to fisheries in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), UNCLOS requires coastal states to 
promote optimum utilisation in their EEZs,21 while ensuring that the living resources there are not 
endangered by overexploitation.22 States are instructed to restore or maintain stocks at the maximum 
sustainable yield.23 These requirements were driven in part by an economic rationality that fish stocks 
should be exploited, but not so extensively that they be overfished (and thus potentially impact on 
other stocks beyond the EEZ). However, UNCLOS does have some reference to environmental 
principles beyond the management of fish stocks for economic purposes. Coastal states are instructed 
to take into account the effects of management measures on associated species so as not to endanger 
such species, but this is a long way from requiring an ecosystem approach to fisheries management. 
Part VI imposes no specific environmental obligations on coastal states in respect of sedentary species 
on the continental shelf. 
On the high seas, the freedom to fish is subject to the duty to cooperate with other states to take 
measures to conserve living resources, including establishing RFMOs.24 States must aim to maintain 
or restore fish populations at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, and there is 
another instruction to take into account associated or dependent species when agreeing on measures 
on the high seas. 
The need to protect the marine environment is found in other parts of UNCLOS. The regime for 
the seabed beyond national jurisdiction instructs the International Seabed Authority to adopt rules for 
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from activities on the seabed and to protect and 
conserve the flora and fauna of the marine environment.25 Coastal states may take steps in areas under 
  
19  See for example arts 192 and 206. 
20  Article 237. 
21  Article 62(1). 
22  Article 61(2). 
23  Article 61(3). For a critique of this approach see Ellen Hey "The Persistence of a Concept: Maximum 
Sustainable Yield" (2012) 27 IJMCL 763. 
24  Articles 117–118. 
25  Article 145. 
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their jurisdiction, including the territorial sea26 and EEZ,27 to protect the marine environment. Coastal 
states may also refuse permission for marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental 
shelf where the project might introduce harmful substances into the marine environment.28 
UNCLOS provided a significant leap forward in environmental protection, particularly in the area 
of marine pollution, as the first truly global response to the problem.29 However, its provisions in 
relation to regulating the environmental effect of other activities, especially fisheries, were limited in 
scope. Following the conclusion of the Convention, it became clear that the expansion of coastal state 
jurisdiction over 90 per cent of the world's fish stocks had not eliminated problems. In particular, 
straddling and highly migratory stocks appeared to pose a significant cooperation challenge that the 
international community was not able to solve based solely on UNCLOS. 
IV THE SUCCESSES OF UNCLOS AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
TREATY 
Bernard Oxman has argued that successful environmental regulation requires universality, 
precision, adaptability and legal obligation.30 Although the requirement for legality as a criterion of 
success has been contested,31 in some respects UNCLOS has met these criteria.  
There can be no doubt that Part XII of UNCLOS has clarified the roles and obligations of flag and 
coastal states in relation to pollution measures, especially discharges from ships. A particularly 
important feature of the Convention is that it allows states to establish laws in their maritime zones 
"giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards established through the 
competent international organization or general diplomatic conference".32 This reference to 
"generally accepted" rules and standards is repeated, in varying forms, in Part XII and in other parts 
of the Convention. For example, UNCLOS requires that states put in place rules around dumping that 
are "no less effective in preventing, reducing and controlling such pollution than the global rules and 
  
26  Article 21(1). 
27  Article 211(5). 
28  Article 246(5). 
29  Moira L McConnell and Edgar Gold "The Modern Law of the Sea: Framework for the Protection and 
Preservation of the Marine Environment?" (1991) 23 Case W Res J Intl L 83 at 85. 
30  Bernard H Oxman "The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards" (1991) 24 NYU J Intl 
Law & Pol 109 at 111–113. 
31  See for example Edith Brown Weiss "Understanding Compliance with International Environmental 
Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths" (1999) 32 U Rich L Rev 1555 at 1566; Kal Raustiala "Compliance 
& Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation" (2000) 32 Case W Res J Intl L 387 at 423; and Kal 
Raustiala "Form and Substance in International Agreements" (2005) 99 AJIL 581 at 612. 
32  Article 211(5). 
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standards".33 Article 94(5) requires flag states to conform to generally accepted international 
regulations, procedures and practices when establishing regulation of their vessels. The effect of such 
"rules of reference" in many cases is to allow states to enforce generally accepted international rules 
and standards against all vessels in their maritime zones, including those flagged to states that may 
not have accepted the particular treaty or rule.34  
The enforcement powers of coastal states were also strengthened under Part XII. Rather than 
relying solely on the flag state to enforce violations of rules that led to pollution outside the territorial 
sea, UNCLOS clarified and even extended the enforcement rights of non-flag states. In particular, 
Article 218 gave powers to port states to take steps to "institute proceedings" against vessels that have 
polluted in another state's maritime zones or on the high seas in contravention of "applicable 
international rules and standards established through the competent international organization". 
Although the flag state retains the ability to take over the investigation and enforcement, the extension 
of rights to port states has dramatically increased the possibility that vessels violating international 
standards and causing pollution can be held accountable.35 
Boyle has argued that UNCLOS is comprehensive, in that it covers all forms of marine pollution, 
and "reflects a fundamental shift from power to duty as the central controlling principle of the legal 
regime for the protection of the marine environment".36 It has created a base on which to build further 
rules. 
Regardless of this praise, it cannot be said that Part XII is an unmitigated success. Many of the 
provisions in Part XII are phrased in a relatively weak way, including the articles on atmospheric and 
land-based pollution.37 There has also been some doubt about where and when broad provisions such 
as Article 192's general obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment apply to other 
activities such as fishing in a way to impose specific obligations.38  
  
33  Article 210(6). See also arts 21, 94(5), 60, 208(3) and 211. 
34  On rules of reference, see generally James Harrison Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development 
of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) at 165–179; Oxman, above n 30, at 
122–139; and W van Reenen "Rules of Reference in the new Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular 
in connection with the pollution of the sea by oil from tankers" (1981) 12 NYIL 3. 
35  For a view that not enough power was given to coastal states see Daniel Bodansky "Protecting the Marine 
Environment from Vessel-Source Pollution: UNCLOS III and Beyond" (1991) 18 Ecology LQ 719 at 768. 
36  Boyle, above n 17, at 370. 
37  At 354. 
38  Valentin Schatz "Fishing for Interpretation: The ITLOS Advisory Opinion on Flag State Responsibility for 
Illegal Fishing in the EEZ" (2016) 47 Ocean Dev & Intl L 327 at 333–334. 
580 (2018) 49 VUWLR 
V THE LIMITATIONS OF UNCLOS AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
TREATY 
There has been no shortage of academic commentators over the years pointing out the difficulties 
and problems in relying on UNCLOS to improve environmental protection. With regards to Oxman's 
criteria, it is possible to see that UNCLOS has particular problems with achieving universality, 
precision and adaptability in some contexts. 
A Structural Limitations with UNCLOS 
There are a number of weaknesses in the structure of UNCLOS, and the law of the sea generally, 
that make it difficult to achieve progress on environmental protection.  
One concern is that the rhetoric of "freedom" that underpins activities on the high seas is an 
impediment to convincing states that activities should be curtailed in order to protect the marine 
environment. Rayfuse refers to the freedom of the high seas as an anachronistic "theoretical 
foundation of the law of the sea".39 As she rightly points out, this rhetoric is outdated for two reasons. 
First, the freedom of fishing was based on the idea that the living marine resources were inexhaustible; 
however, we now understand that this is not the case.40 Second, a number of limitations on the 
freedom of the high seas have developed over time.41 These include limitations imposed by UNCLOS 
itself as well as in a range of other treaties. Despite this, states are often reluctant to accept further 
voluntary limitations due to the common property regime that has been established.42 Rayfuse argues 
that:43 
 … this reification of the freedom, or at any rate of the rhetoric of freedom, hinders the ability of the law 
of the sea to develop in a way that addresses the multiple challenges posed by contemporary and emerging 
ocean uses.  
  
39  Rosemary Rayfuse "Some Reflections on What's Wrong with the Law of the Sea" in Cedric Ryngaert, Erik J 
Molenaar and Sarah MH Nouwen (eds) What's Wrong with International Law? – Liber Amicorum AHA Soons 
(Brill, Leiden, 2015) 16 at 17. 
40  At 17. 
41  At 18. 
42  Rosemary Rayfuse and Robin Warner "Securing a Sustainable Future for the Oceans Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: The Legal Basis for an Integrated Cross-Sectoral Regime for High Seas Governance for the 21st  
Century" (2008) 23 IJMCL 399 at 407. 
43  Rayfuse, above n 39, at 19. 
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A second structural difficulty, connected to the first, is the strong dependence on exclusive flag 
state jurisdiction and the existence of flags of convenience.44 This leads to problems achieving 
universal coverage of treaty norms. UNCLOS establishes that vessels on the high seas are entitled to 
fly the flag of a state, which has exclusive jurisdiction over that vessel while it is in the high seas.45 
Exclusive flag state jurisdiction makes sense if one assumes that all states will take responsibility for 
enforcing international standards on their vessels and punishing violations of the law. Unfortunately, 
many states are not willing – or are unable – to exercise effective control over vessels flying their 
flags. This means that states may have little ability to prevent vessels flagged to other states that are 
blatantly violating international legal rules on the high seas. 
There are very limited cases in which one state can exercise jurisdiction over another state's 
vessels on the high seas.46 These include piracy, which is the only case in which universal 
enforcement jurisdiction exists. Many fewer rights, primarily involving a right to visit, are available 
when the vessel is involved in slave trading or unauthorised broadcasting.47 There have been attempts 
to broaden the situations in which non-flag states can board a vessel on the high seas through treaties 
such as the ship boarding regimes embodied in the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
(UNFSA).48 While this has had some effect in RFMO regimes, it is still dependent on a state agreeing 
to be party to either the UNFSA or a relevant RFMO. A truly recalcitrant state is able to avoid all 
obligations and avoid sanctions for its vessels operating contrary to treaty-based restrictions designed 
to protect the environment. 
A third structural problem can be identified if UNCLOS is compared to multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs). The majority of MEAs create institutions to make decisions about the operation 
of the regime, develop new rules where necessary and improve enforcement. These include a 
  
44  H Edwin Anderson "The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and 
Alternatives" (1996) 21 Tul Mar LJ 139; and Jessica K Ferrell "Controlling Flags of Convenience: One 
Measure to Stop Overfishing of Collapsing Fish Stocks" (2005) 35 Envtl L 323. 
45  UNCLOS, art 92. 
46  Article 110. 
47  In the case of unauthorised broadcasting, there are some states other than the flag state that can prosecute 
offenders, including the state which is receiving the broadcasting and the state of which the offender is a 
national: art 109. 
48  Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks 2167 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 4 December 1995, entered into force 11 December 
2001). See also Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (opened for signature 14 October 2005, entered into force 
28 July 2010), which allows states to voluntarily accept processes allowing other states to board their vessels. 
No states have so far declared their willingness to waive their exclusive flag state jurisdiction even in cases 
of serious maritime crimes. 
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Conference of the Parties, a secretariat, technical and scientific committees and often compliance 
committees.49 This approach to establishing institutions leads to more adaptable regimes because 
there is a process for updating and amending current measures. There are sectoral bodies in the law 
of the sea that are certainly capable of performing these functions, such as the International Seabed 
Authority, the International Maritime Organization and RFMOs. However, these institutions are 
sectoral rather than comprehensive in nature, focusing on a specific range of issues. In the case of 
RFMOs they may have limited competence to deal with all fish species or broader environmental 
issues. Regional seas programmes (RSPs) are a possible option for achieving more comprehensive 
governance of a region, but there are relatively few RSPs that are effectively exercising this role.50 
There is a regular meeting of states party to UNCLOS, but it has a very circumscribed role limited to 
administrative and financial matters.51 The General Assembly has contributed by passing annual 
resolutions on oceans and fisheries and promoting informal discussions about oceans issues. However, 
the overall picture is of a plethora of institutions dealing with different aspects of oceans governance, 
with greater or lesser degrees of effectiveness. This fragmentation means that some environmental 
concerns can fall between the cracks and not be adequately addressed.52 
The lack of an overarching decision-making body that can address issues related to the oceans 
more generally has been keenly felt. When new issues arise for which there is no obvious institutional 
home or even a set of legal rules, states have to attempt to deal with the problem within existing, 
specialised frameworks. This is evident in the response to questions around ocean iron fertilisation, 
which is now dealt with under the auspices of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter despite the fact that the activity is not actually "dumping" 
as defined by UNCLOS.53 Although states were ultimately able to reach agreement on how to respond 
to proposals for ocean fertilisation, arguably the response was significantly slowed by uncertainty and 
debate about the competence of the parties to the Convention to address the problem.54 These sorts of 
  
49  Robin R Churchill and Geir Ulfstein "Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law" (2000) 94 AJIL 623; and Jutta Brunnée 
"COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements" (2002) 15 LJIL 1. 
50  Julien Rochette and others "Regional oceans governance mechanisms: A review" (2015) 60 Mar Poly 9; and 
Julien Rochette and Raphaël Billé "Bridging the Gap between Legal and Institutional Developments within 
Regional Seas Frameworks" (2013) 28 IJMCL 433. 
51  Rothwell and Stephens, above n 11, at 527. 
52  Harrison, above n 2, at 276. 
53  Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, above n 15; and 
UNCLOS, art 1(5).  
54  See for example Kerstin Güssow and others "Ocean iron fertilization: Why further research is needed" (2010) 
34 Mar Poly 911 at 914; and Rosemary Rayfuse, Mark G Lawrence and Kristina M Gjerde "Ocean 
Fertilisation and Climate Change: The Need to Regulate Emerging High Seas Uses" (2008) 23 IJMCL 297 at 
307. 
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issues could be ameliorated if UNCLOS had created a decision-making framework more similar to 
MEAs, with competence over all oceans issues, that was capable of making new rules to respond to 
new challenges.55 However, this was rejected in the 1950s as "impracticable".56 
Another problem is that UNCLOS approached fisheries in particular with an old-fashioned 
approach to marine ecosystems. In the Convention, marine species are referred to as marine "living 
resources", a term that dates back to the 1958 Geneva Conventions,57 and earlier. This reflects a 
perspective that such species are economic units, similar to oil and minerals. Sustainability of these 
resources of necessity involves regulation of their exploitation, but they were not traditionally viewed 
as part of an ecosystem that needed to be managed as a whole. The idea of sustainable development, 
in which the interests of the environment need to be balanced against economic and social 
development, did not emerge until the 1980s. The importance of biodiversity emerged in the 1990s 
with the Convention on Biological Diversity.58 Some effort was put into expanding the scope of 
RFMO responsibilities in the UNFSA to include considerations of ecosystems and biodiversity. 
However, the extent to which RFMOs actually protect ecosystems from the impacts of fishing varies. 
All of these structural problems have been long recognised. States have tried to counter them by 
improving sectoral institutions and negotiating new treaties to circumscribe state behaviour. However, 
there has never been sufficient political will to fundamentally reconsider the underlying structures of 
the law of the sea. This is why UNCLOS may never be truly successful as an environmental treaty. 
Although states can tinker with the rules around the edges, not all states are equally interested in 
achieving environmental protection, especially if it comes at an economic or social cost or involves 
the loss of perceived freedoms. 
B Fisheries and Protection of Marine Biodiversity 
The structural limitations mentioned above have particularly impacted on the ability of UNCLOS 
and related instruments to ensure environmental protection in a fisheries/biodiversity context, 
particularly in areas beyond national jurisdiction. With the creation of EEZs, UNCLOS gave coastal 
states sufficient jurisdiction to sustainably manage the living resources and also to take steps to protect 
  
55  See Rayfuse and Warner, above n 42, at 420. 
56  Harrison, above n 2, at 298. 
57  Convention on the High Seas 450 UNTS 11 (opened for signature 29 April 1958, entered into force 30 
September 1962); Convention on the Continental Shelf 499 UNTS 311 (opened for signature 29 April 1958, 
entered into force 10 June 1964); Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 516 UNTS 205 
(opened for signature 29 April 1958, entered into force 10 September 1964); and Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 559 UNTS 285 (opened for signature 29 April 1958, 
entered into force 20 March 1966).  
58  Convention on Biological Diversity 1760 UNTS 79 (opened for signature 5 June 1992, entered into force 29 
December 1993).  
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marine biodiversity more generally.59 Beyond those areas under national jurisdiction, it is much more 
difficult to make progress due to the relatively weak provisions for protecting the high seas marine 
environment in UNCLOS. Any progress involving regulation of activities on the high seas relies on 
state agreement, through treaties and institutions, if they exist.  
In light of the structural obstacles, it is noteworthy that significant progress has been made since 
the conclusion of UNCLOS in the regulation of fisheries beyond national jurisdiction. In particular, 
the 1995 UNFSA was an important step in expanding on the concept of cooperation in relation to 
straddling and highly migratory stocks.60 It reinforced that concepts such as protection of biodiversity, 
ecosystems management and the precautionary approach were to be implemented by RFMOs.61 It 
established a framework for inspection of non-flag vessels on the high seas where the vessels are 
fishing in an area governed by an RFMO.62 
Work done at a non-binding level has also been influential. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization's work in relation to illegal fishing and port state measures has been particularly 
important, with the latter leading to a treaty on the topic.63 The General Assembly, through its annual 
resolutions, has also had an impact on state behaviour. Two examples include the resolutions seeking 
the halt of large-scale driftnet fishing64 and the call for RFMOs to take steps to protect vulnerable 
marine ecosystems on the seabed from the impacts of destructive fishing practices.65 
Despite this progress, it is possible to identify difficulties based on the structural issues discussed 
above. As already mentioned, many institutions do exist to manage fisheries in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. While some of these RFMOs do appear to manage fishing effort sustainably, for many 
RFMOs they have not been entirely successful in achieving sustainability. One study has suggested 
that, although conservation is part of the mandate of all RFMOs, their priority appears to have been 
  
59  In addition, the Convention on Biological Diversity imposes obligations on coastal states to achieve 
sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas within their jurisdictions: arts 6–8.  
60  Articles 7–8 in particular. 
61  Articles 5–6. 
62  Articles 21–22. 
63  Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing (2016) 55 ILM 1159 (opened for signature 22 November 2009, entered into force 5 June 2016). 
64  Grant J Hewison "The Legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas Driftnet Fishing" 
(1994) 25 J Mar L & Com 557. 
65  See for example Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related 
instruments GA Res 61/105 (2006). See BC O'Leary and others "The first network of marine protected areas 
(MPAs) in the high seas: The process, the challenges, and where next" (2012) 36 Mar Poly 598. 
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to "guide the exploitation of fish stocks".66 The authors argue that the performance of many RFMOs 
is poor, pointing out that 67 per cent of the stocks assessed were depleted or overfished.67 While there 
have been many reasons suggested for the problems facing RFMOs, the following issues reflect the 
structural challenges mentioned above. 
The freedom of the fishing on the high seas makes state agreement crucial. RFMOs do not cover 
the entire ocean or all fish stocks. The application of the freedom of the high seas in unregulated areas 
means that "the default position is that States can fish until they reach agreement not to fish".68 Gjerde 
and others point to the fact that, during negotiations for a South Pacific Fisheries Management 
Organisation and before the Convention came into force, a "race to fish" caused stocks of jack 
mackerel to drop from an estimated 30 million metric tonnes to less than 3 million metric tonnes.69 
This is a reflection of the phenomenon known as the "tragedy of the commons".70 
Where RFMOs do exist, they are not always effective. Frequently, the membership of the RFMO 
does not reflect all the states whose vessels are fishing for a stock. This means that a portion of the 
fishing effort remains unregulated by the RFMO.71 In addition, there is little coordination and 
cooperation among RFMOs, but also between RFMOs and other international institutions with 
responsibility for oceans.72 
Another weakness is the fact that RFMOs often use consensus-based decision-making, which 
makes agreement on measures which involve curtailing fishing effort hard to achieve.73 Even where 
the RFMO has a majority-based decision-making process, states are usually able to object to a 
measure and opt out of implementing it. An interesting development in this space is the South Pacific 
  
66  Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly "Failing the high seas: A global evaluation of regional fisheries 
management organizations" (2010) 34 Mar Poly 1036 at 1042. 
67  At 1039. 
68  Kristina M Gjerde and others "Ocean in peril: Reforming the management of global ocean living resources in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction" (2013) 74 Mar Pollut Bullet 540 at 544. 
69  At 541. 
70  Andrew Serdy "Pacta Tertiis and Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms: The IUU Fishing Concept 
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71  Brian Pentz and others "Can regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) manage resources 
effectively during climate change?" (2018) 92 Mar Poly 13 at 17. 
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governance approach" (2017) 84 Mar Poly 327 at 328. 
73  Gjerde and others, above n 68, at 543; and Antonia Leroy and Michel Morin "Innovation in the decision-
making process of RFMOs" (2018) 97 Mar Poly 156 at 157–158.  
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Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, which has a procedure which is designed to minimise 
the number of objections.74 
Another issue is the phenomenon of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing).75 
This descriptor describes certain types of behaviour that undermine sustainable fishing. The problems 
arise from areas where there is no regulatory body, where a fishing vessel is flagged to a state that has 
not acceded to an RFMO convention or is not a cooperating non-party, and where vessels flagged to 
a state party fail to follow the rules. While all of these problems have different origins and solutions,76 
they generally reflect many of the structural issues mentioned above. These include a reluctance by 
some states to become bound by the conservation and management measures of RFMOs, as well as 
the difficulties of exercising jurisdiction over foreign vessels. A large suite of legal tools has been 
deployed to combat illegal fishing, including black and white lists of vessels, catch documentation 
schemes, electronic vessel monitoring, port state inspections and at-sea inspections making use of 
non-flag state boarding procedures established in the UNFSA.77 Although significant progress has 
been made at suppressing IUU fishing in some cases, the international community has not been able 
to eliminate it.78 
Most RFMOs were established in an era when the importance of marine biodiversity was 
unknown. Although UNCLOS does contain some directives to states to consider the effects of fishing 
on associated or dependent species,79 awareness of ecosystems-based management concepts and 
modern management principles including the precautionary approach have developed since that time. 
Some RFMOs have updated their management instruments to allow themselves to take a broader 
  
74  Howard S Schiffman "The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO): an 
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Sustainable Development Goals (2018) at 101.  
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No 1106 FIRO/R1106 (En), 4 February 2015). 
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range of measures to protect the marine environment.80 However, this development is piecemeal and 
some RFMOs have lagged behind in developing effective measures. 
VI INCREMENTAL CHANGE: LOOKING FORWARD 
The structural issues with UNCLOS have not prevented states and commentators from looking 
for improvements in the legal framework for the oceans. Incremental change can make significant 
inroads in filling the gaps in the governance system. This part of the article briefly examines two 
recent developments which have the potential to improve marine environmental management. First, 
a number of international courts and tribunals have begun to recognise the importance of 
environmental principles in regulating state behaviour. There is potential for these principles, which 
are found both in customary and treaty law, to be developed so that states have to give greater 
consideration to their environmental impact on the oceans. Second, the international community has 
begun to negotiate a new implementing agreement to UNCLOS focusing on the protection of marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.  While it is still early days, this process could result 
in new institutional mechanisms and governance principles that will allow some of the weaknesses of 
UNCLOS to be addressed. 
A International Environmental Principles and the Law of the Sea in 
Dispute Settlement 
Incorporating new principles into existing legal frameworks is difficult. Treaties can take a long 
time, if ever, to amend. The amendment procedures in UNCLOS are particularly complicated, 
requiring ratification or accession by two thirds of the state parties.81 States are reluctant to renegotiate 
existing frameworks for fear of undermining the consensus that was achieved in the past.  However, 
recent developments in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals has revived the role of 
customary international law in providing obligations on states in relation to the environment. In 
addition, states are increasingly focusing on the violation of environmental law treaty obligations in 
their disputes with one another. These developments have been relatively modest, but have underlined 
the possibility for dispute settlement processes to reinforce environmental obligations in the law of 
the sea. 
One of the striking examples of this development was the Pulp Mills case, in which the 
International Court of Justice established important principles for managing transboundary harm.82 
Among the obligations identified by the Court in that case was the obligation on a state to exercise 
due diligence in meeting its environmental duties, including the obligation to conduct an 
  
80  Food and Agriculture Organization, above n 77, at 78. 
81  Articles 312–316. See Yoshifumi Tanaka The International Law of the Sea (2nd ed, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2015) at 32–33. 
82  Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) [2010] ICJ Rep 14. 
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environmental impact assessment if there is a risk that an activity under the state's control may have 
a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context.83 The Court stated that the latter was a 
principle of customary international law.84 Although this was not a marine environmental protection 
case, it is a notable indication by the Court that it is willing to derive important environmental 
obligations for states from customary international law.85 
These principles were referred to by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 
its Advisory Opinion on activities in the Area.86 The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the Tribunal was 
asked to elaborate on the obligations of states that sponsored entities undertaking activities on the 
deep seabed (the Area). ITLOS noted that UNCLOS and relevant regulations issued by the 
International Seabed Authority contained important obligations. However, it also recognised that 
customary international law created obligations on states. In respect of the precautionary approach, 
the Tribunal suggested that the inclusion of the approach, as reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration,87 in treaties and other instruments "initiated a trend towards making this approach part 
of customary international law".88 The Tribunal also suggested that a state that was required to 
exercise due diligence to meet environmental obligations in treaties may be required as a consequence 
to follow the precautionary approach.89 This was a significant step by an international tribunal to 
embed the precautionary approach into the corpus of the law of the sea in a way that goes further than 
the precise wording of particular treaties.90 It is possible that a future tribunal, interpreting the 
obligation in Article 192 of UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment, might consider 
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the application of the precautionary approach a part of the state's obligation to exercise due diligence 
to implement Article 192. 
The Tribunal was also keen to point out that the obligations on states to conduct environmental 
impact assessments sprang from customary international law as well as treaty law.91 It referred to the 
Pulp Mills decision, and stated that the ICJ's:92 
… reasoning in a transboundary context may also apply to activities with an impact on the environment 
in an area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and the Court's references to 'shared resources' may 
also apply to resources that are the common heritage of mankind … 
Another way in which tribunals have contributed to the incorporation of environmental principles 
is in the interpretation of UNCLOS, particularly Article 192. A second advisory opinion was issued 
by ITLOS at the request of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission in 2015.93 Although the focus 
was on the responsibility of states for IUU fishing, the Tribunal briefly addressed the relationship 
between Article 192 and the responsibility of flag states to ensure their vessels comply with coastal 
state measures. The Tribunal noted that the conservation and management of living resources is linked 
with the protection and preservation of the marine environment.94  
The most significant recent decision on marine environmental protection is the arbitral award in 
the South China Sea Arbitration.95 The Tribunal found that China had failed to prevent its fishermen 
from harvesting endangered marine species96 and that its construction of artificial islands has had a 
significant adverse impact on the marine environment.97 The Tribunal read the obligation in Article 
192 in light of the instruction in Article 194(5) to take measures necessary to protect and preserve rare 
or fragile ecosystems. It also considered that Article 192 must be "read against the background of 
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other applicable international law".98 The Tribunal referred to China's acceptance of the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)99 and stated that 
Article 192 imposes a due diligence obligation that "extends to the prevention of harms that would 
affect depleted, threatened, or endangered species indirectly through the destruction of their 
habitat".100 In relation to the construction of artificial islands, the Tribunal concluded that China had 
breached its obligations under arts 192 and 194.101 It observed that China owed obligations to 
cooperate that stemmed from UNCLOS.102 The Tribunal also found that China bore obligations to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment, based on Article 206 of UNCLOS.103 
What is notable about the South China Sea Arbitration is the clear connection between the failure 
to take steps to protect vulnerable marine species from exploitation and the obligation to protect the 
environment. Also interesting is that China's membership of CITES appears to have been taken into 
account in applying Article 192, and also that the Convention on Biological Diversity was used to 
interpret the meaning of "ecosystem" in Article 194.104 
It is possible that states may increasingly turn to international dispute settlement to resolve matters 
around marine environmental protection. It is unlikely to be a cure-all, however. To be effective, we 
would need to see clear evidence that the pronouncements of tribunals as to the law are being 
implemented widely in state practice. In addition, the ability of decisions of courts and tribunals to 
adjust state behaviour is potentially limited. Recently Russia and China have rejected the jurisdiction 
of tribunals formed under Part XV of UNCLOS, which may limit the influence of adjudicatory 
bodies.105 There is also the fact that customary international law is not best suited for the development 
of a precise body of environmental rules. States have tended to prefer establishing rules through treaty 
regimes.106 Therefore, the impact of such cases may be limited to bilateral or local disputes. 
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B Protection of Marine Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction 
A second, and possibly more significant development, is represented by the current negotiations 
in the United Nations for a new international legally binding instrument for the protection of marine 
biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. In 2017 the General Assembly agreed to begin 
negotiations for a new internationally binding instrument.107 The treaty must be consistent with 
UNCLOS, but one of the key goals is to address gaps in the existing legal framework. The areas that 
have been focused on by the discussions so far have been the legal regime for marine genetic 
resources, area-based management, environmental impact assessment and capacity building. It has 
been suggested that the new agreement could require states to comply with important environmental 
principles including the precautionary approach, ecosystem-based management, cooperation and 
stewardship.108  
In addition, some have argued that the agreement could create institutional frameworks and 
establish a legal regime for the exploitation of marine genetic resources.109 Many suggestions for the 
agreement have focused on creating an institution. Some have argued for a body with legislative 
functions, while others prefer to see something limited to coordination or recommendatory 
functions.110 The issue of marine genetic resources is possibly the most contentious substantive legal 
topic that will need to be addressed by the agreement. It also poses the greatest risk of derailing 
consensus on a new treaty. 
There are a number of obstacles to the conclusion of the new agreement. One problem is the extent 
to which the agreement will interact with existing global and regional bodies, such as RFMOs. The 
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General Assembly has stipulated that the agreement must not undermine existing organisations.111 If 
the agreement does introduce mechanisms for modern environmental governance, but fails to extend 
these to existing institutions such as RFMOs, then the possible impact of the agreement could be 
drastically limited. Given the key sectoral activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction are currently 
subject to a fragmented legal framework, the agreement could fail to achieve much progress in moving 
towards a more integrated legal framework. Some states, for whom the current (inadequate) system 
of managing fisheries resources is consistent with their perceived national interest, will seek to ensure 
the new agreement is weak or is not finalised. This would be disappointing, but the roots of that 
disappointment lie in the structural limitations of UNCLOS already discussed. 
VII CONCLUSION 
A recent study has shown that only around 13 per cent of the oceans can be said to be true 
wilderness areas, with biologically and ecologically intact seascapes that are mostly free of human 
disturbances.112 Most of these are located on the high seas and most in the Pacific or in the Southern 
Ocean. The impact of climate change on these areas is likely to be extreme.113 Human activity has 
affected the vast majority of our oceans. Given this troubling statistic, the ability of UNCLOS and the 
law of the sea more generally to protect the marine environment will become more critical than ever 
in the near future.  
UNCLOS was a grand package deal that pushed the limits of existing regulation in many ways, 
but at its heart it left intact structural problems that remain today. States have done their best to push 
the legal framework towards a more sustainable future, but the dynamic evolution of the law of the 
sea has, thus far, failed to address the key problems at the core of UNCLOS. This is not a criticism of 
those who drafted UNCLOS. The diplomats negotiating UNCLOS, while more aware of the marine 
environment than previously, never could have imagined the scale of human impacts on the oceans 
that is seen today. In addition, vested interests in the economic exploration of the oceans likely 
prevented a more radical shake-up of the existing order.  
Is there hope that the law of the sea will evolve into a more robust system for environmental 
protection? Climate change is predicted to exacerbate the existing problems in managing the marine 
environment, so the issue is becoming more urgent than ever before. We are seeing some signs of 
hope in the increasing reference to environmental principles in dispute settlement and the prospects 
of a new agreement on sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. There have 
always been states pushing the international system to perform better through incremental 
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improvements to the legal framework. The serious question is whether this will be sufficient, and 
timely enough, to prevent further deterioration of the marine environment. Despite Philip Allott's hope 
that UNCLOS would usher in a new age of international law aimed at protecting social objectives, 
the traditional view of international law as existing for the protection of state interests appears to have 
not released its grip on the law of the sea. His suggestion was that we consider that "[t]he sea is our 
sea because we find ourselves to be cohabitants with the sea on the planet Earth and because all human 
beings naturally share its potentialities."114 Perhaps it is not too late. 
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